CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 91

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he questionT

nature, duration and purpose of our military

presence after independence, the point was made that the latest intelligence assessment was that the United Arab Republic was unlikely

to launch a military invasion of South Arabia after our withdrawal; but she certainly would not de so as long as we remained. The main

purpose of our forces should be deterrence and to this end we should

be able to pose a credible threat of retaliation. In view of the

very great difficulties involved in stationing forces at Khormaksar,

further consideration should be given to maintaining our presence with naval forces off shore, possibly including a commando carrier and an

aircraft carrier.

In discussion of the possibility of persuading the President of

the United Arab Republic, President Nasser, to end the Egyptian-inspired

and supported terrorist campaign in South Arabia, it was suggested that

there might be advantage in arranging a meeting with President Nasser,

provided that he agreed first to end the terrorist campaign. On the

other hand it was argued that he was most unlikely, in view of his wider

ambitions in the area, to agree to end the terrorist campaign as a

pre-condition to talks on South Arabia, or perhaps even to carry out

any such agreement subsequently; in any event extreme care should be taken about any approach to him while terrorism continued in South Arabia. Any

public statement of the intention to have discussions with President Nasser

would have a disastrous effect, not only on the Federal Government in

South Arabia and other friendly Governments in the Middle East, but also

on the morale of our forces and the civil administration in Aden.

Greater prospects of success lay in persuading one or more of the nationalist groups in Aden to co-operate with us. Meanwhile we should

adopt the measures proposed by the Foreign Secretary in paragraph 7 of OPD(67) 18 for dealing with the terrorist threat. The point was however

made that the proposed jamming of the Egyptian-controlled radio was a

departure from our normal policy of not jamming hostile broadcasts; on

the other hand, the Egyptian broadcasts that would be jammed were being used not only for propaganda but also to direct subversive operations in South Arabia and it would not be necessary to make use of BBC facilities

for jamming in this case.

The Committee

(1) Agreed that the granting of independence to South Arabia

should be advanced to 1st November 1967 and that on this date all rights of sovereignty and protection in South Arabia should cease; the necessary legislation should be prepared and passed before the Summer Recess.

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